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I. INTRODUCTION
The oft-cited case of Baker v. Bolton1 forever established the
common law rule that there could be no civil action for the death
of a human being. The decision was no doubt prompted by the his-
torical considerations that tort actions were only an adjunct to crim-
inal law, and that, traditionally, the crown confiscated the property
of any person committing homicide.2 Consequently, nothing was
left to compensate the estate or beneficiaries of the deceased, so
a civil action would have been meaningless.3 The exclusiveness of
the action by the state if a felony had been committed was thus
said to merge any tort action into the criminal judgment. In
Baker, however, the merger doctrine of tort and criminal law was
not appropriate, for the wrong of the defendant was only a mis.
demeanor and the state was excluded from executing on the prop.
ery.4 Thus, Lord Ellenborough had occasion to pronounce a new
doctrine of recovery. He conservatively, though perhaps illogic'
ally, chose to decline the opportunity and held simply that the
death of a human being was not actionable in a civil court. It
has been exceedingly convenient and soothing for the legal pro.
fession to criticize this manifestly unjust and irrational rule, having
had fifteen decades of additional experience from which to summon
arguments. Unfortunately, it has also been fashionable to do so
rather than to direct attention to the morass which confronts any
would-be litigant in a death action. This is not, however, because
our present society must directly confront the common law rule.
That convention was abandoned in 1846 with the passage of the
first statute allowing a civil action for wrongful death: "Act for
compensating the Families of Persons killed by Accidents."5 Com-
monly referred to as Lord Campbell's Act, the statute has weathered
progress and defied its proper role of serving only as a beginning.
Most United States jurisdictions adopted its vague wording and
have since added only piece-meal variations which offer little aid to
1 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
2 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 120, at 920 (3rd ed. 1964).
3 Hay, Death as a Civil Cause of Action in Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. Rv. 170,
172 (1893).
4 See Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules. 13 VAND, L.
RE%,. 605, 615 (1960.)
5 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846).
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the courts or to those who would attempt to divine the legislative
intent. Some jurisdictions have added or substituted survival statutes
which continue the cause of action the decedent would have had
had he lived. Others combine their wrongful death and survival
acts thereby offering any number of variations concerning the proper
parties to the action, defenses and the distribution of damages. The
results of this adherence to Lord Campbell's Act, the fragmented
attempts at change and the beckoning doctrine of the Baker case
combine to offer a stilted and many times irrational approach to
the entire area. Legislatures have repeatedly written the various
kinds of death acts in indefinite terms and thrust responsible imple-
mentation onto persuasive lawyers, hopefully progressive courts
and confused juries. The results are understandably diverse. This
article will attempt to digest only those doctrines representing either
a substantial majority or minority, indicate definite trends and
propose approaches which have either proved successful, or could
so prove, in the prosecution of a death action.
II. KINDS OF STATUTES DISTINGUISHED
Lord Campbell's Act specifically designated "the Wife, Hus-
band, Parent and Child ' as the beneficiaries of a death action. Be-
cause a civil action upon death was authorized exclusively by statute,
none but designated beneficiaries or their representatives had any
standing in court. Most United States jurisdictions have since ex-
panded their laws to include or substitute a cause of action for the
benefit of a decedenes estate, whether the injury in question was the
cause of death or not. That is, a personal injury action will not lapse
simply because the injured person dies from independent causes. His
representative may prosecute any action the decedent had at death.
It is theoretically important to distinguish between a survival action,
which is for the benefit of a decedent's estate, and a wrongful death
action, which is for the benefit of statutory beneficiaries. The former
supposedly only continues the cause of action the decedent had at
death, although the statutes often allow the jury to also award ex-
penses and damages to the estate which have been caused by the
death.7 The wrongful death acts, however, create an entirely new
cause of action brought into existence by the death itself. More
importantly, they need to be separated because the kinds and measure
of damages vary in important respects and because the statutes dic-
tate to whom any recovery will flow.
6 Id.
7 S. SPEISR, REcoVERY FOR WRONGFUL DJAvTi § 14:2 (1966). [hereinafter cited as
SPMCEP].
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Most wrongful death statutes provide that damages ,are to be
assessed in accordante With -the loss designated beneficiaries have
suffered by reason, of the death." The appropriate figure is arrived at
by assessing the present value of the probable contributions the de-
ceased would have made to the beneficiaries had he lived. The ma-
jority limit this recovery to pecuniary contributions" but include
the value:of services he might have rendered'0 such as moral and
educational training." That is, the contributions which the jury
considers may be broader than simply the dollars which decedent
gave to beneficiaries. If he rendered a service to them which can be
measured by some standard, the jury may award the dollar worth 6f
that lost service. A few jurisdictions have included the recovery of
medical and funeral expenses 12 and any inheritance which would
have passed to beneficiaries at normal life expectancy.' 8 An allegedly
smaller minority allow recovery for non-pecuniary losses such as
anguish suffered by the beneficiaries and the lost companionship.
That this limitation is often more illusory than real will be seen
in subsequent sections.
The survival statutes usually provide that the personal repre-
sentative of the'deceased may recover for those injuries the decedent
could have been compensated for had he lived.' 4 This measure in-
cludes recoveries normally sought through the common tort actions
such as pain and suffering, care and treatment, and loss of earnings
from injury until time of death. In addition, the measure may in-
dude the' losses the estate suffered measured by the present value
8 See, e.g., the wrongful death statutes of Colorado (COLO. REv. STAT. ANN, §
41-1-3 (1963)) and Maryland (MD. ANN, CODE art. 67, § 4 (1957)).
9 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 US. 59 (1918), is one of the first not-
able wrongful death cases decided in the United States and fairly illustrates this
view. It is also representative of the reasoning which has prevailed since Blake v.
Midland Ry.,_ 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852), held that damages should be
limited to pecuniary losses.
30 Wells, Inc. v. Shoemake, 64 Nev. 57, 177 P.2d 451 (1947).
11 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Baltimore Transit Co. v.
State, '194 Md. 421, 71 A.2d 442 (1950); Prauss v. Adamskl, 195 Ore. 1, 244 P.2d
598 (1952),
12 See, e.g., ALAsA STAT. § 13.20.340 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1310 (1967);
MicH. CoMP. LAws § 27A.2922 (1952); N.Y. DEcED. Esr. § 132 (1949); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1602 (1966).
18 O'Toole v. United States, 242 F.2d 308 (3rd Cir. 1957). This case will be
discussed in later sections because it has served as a landmark since being reported.
The able reasoning by Judge Goodrich has been cited many times in justifying
the award of lost inheritance.
14 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 3, § 839 (Supp. 1966); Oiuo REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.21 (Page Supp. 1966).
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of the probable future earnings the decedent would have realized
had he lived. This last statement would seem to conflict with the
idea that the measure of the award should be based upon the injuries
and damages the decedent had suffered by the time of his death.
The explanation is that a number of jurisdictions statutorily added
post-death considerations to the damages question, thereby forming
a combination survival-death act. Thus these combinations are both
true survival acts which simply substitute decedent's representative
in the action and measure damages as if decedent were alive, and
death acts which may include considerations of funeral expenses
and future lost earnings. If the act is a survival-death type, probable
future earnings are computed by either considering the total gross
income decedent expected and deducting personal expenses, or by
subtracting all expenses from his probable future gross income. The
particular computations which are exercised will depend entirely
upon the leanings of the particular jurisdiction involved.15
The variations on the two basic statutory themes of survival or
death actions are seemingly endless. Some jurisdictions stipulate that
if death was instantaneous, no action for the decedent arose, and
only a wrongful death action is appropriate.10 Some identify their
acts as being in the wrongful death category but measure damages
by a loss to the decedent's estate formula.'7 Some provide for a stir-
vival and wrongful death action by statute, but then demand that a
party elect to proceed under only one.18 Others allow both actions to
be brought separately, while still others insist that they be con-
solidated. No guiding policy or social philosophy appears in these
legislative spasms, and this article cannot be a substitute for a de-
tailed study of the particular jurisdiction's laws and its court's in-
terpretations of them.
Whether to pursue a survival action or wrongful death suit,
or both, to judgment is largely determined initially by statute.
Thus if an attorney discovers that he is limited to one action, or
that a judgment in one bars pursuance of the other, he must immedi-
ately counsel the best choice. The subtle considerations of this deci-
sion will be left to a more expansive treatise: e.g., a survival action
may beckon because of its promise of a large recovery for pain and
suffering, but the jury may not respond to compensating the lifeless,
legally created entity of an estate; or even if it does respond, there
15 This measuring process will be explained in detail in subsequent sections.
16 E.g., Beaven v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 100 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. F12. 1951).
17 E.g., RJ. GF. LAws Ac. § 10-7-1 (1956).
Is C. & 0. Ry. v. Bank's Adm'r, 142 Ky. 746, 135 S.W. 285 (1911).
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may'be creditor -of the estate~waiting to attach the recovery before
the family realizes aiy benefit. -A more concrete cotisideration is how
a:pa ti&il6r defense wll' affett the, decision. Except wherd changdd
by 9tatute,11 the' universal rule is that! cohitributor9 negligence of
the decedent'will bar 136th suivival' and wrongful death actions,20
This limitation stems from Lord Campbell's Act which -stated that
the beneficiaries had 'an-;"Action only if the'decedent could have
maintained one had he lived.2 1 However, 'ihe contributory negli.
gence of a beneficiary normally will not affect a survival action,2 1
While it may decrease or 'even eliminate recovery under a wrongful
death statute.2  Most'jurisdictions similarly hold that a prior judg-
menit for or against the decedent for his fatal injuries will bar a sur-
vival or wrongful death action.24 Many jurisdictions apply the same
result when the decedent has previously settled or compromised his
action.2 5 A growing minority, however, logically reason that the
death action could' not have arisen prior to decedent's demise, by
statutory definition, that it is a new injury in question, and that no
previous judgment or compromise could defeat it even before its
birth.20
The effects o f other distinguishing features of the statutes will
be discussed in subsequent sections if they concern damage con-
siderations.
III. SURVIVAL AcnONS
A. Aspects of Survival Actions
The original English death,act left sizeable questions and gaps
concerning the, status of an injury action upon the death of one of
19 Mississippi and Wisconsin have, for example, passed comparative negligence
statutes. Miss. CoDE ANM. § 1454 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.45 (1966).
20 See, e.g., Davis v. Quality Oil Co., 353 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1962); Seyfcr v. County
of Otoe, 66 Neb. 566, 92 N.W. 756 (1902). The Davis case was a wrongful death action,
the Seyfer case a survival action.
21 Lord Campbell himself initiated this rule shortly after enactment of the Death
Act; Senior v. Ward, 1 El. & El. 385, 120 lEng. Rep. 954 (1859).
22 Burns v. Goldberg, 210 F.2d 646 (3rd Cir. 1954), interpreting the Pennsyl-
vania survival act.
23 See SpasEm, §§ 5:5-5:8 for a complete discussion.
24 Schlavick v. Manhattan Brewing Co., 103 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. 111. 1952), inter.
preting Indiana law.
25 Libera v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc., 20 N.J. Super. 292, 89 A.2d 734
(1952).
26 Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3rd Cir. 1957); Earley v. Pacific Electrie Ry.,
176 Cal. 79, 167 P. 513 (1917).
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the parties.27 There .was no provision for maintaminin or continuing
an-action if an injured party died from causes unrelated to the action
being prosecuted. Furthermore, if the injured party died leaving no
statutory beneficiaries, an action by and for his estate similarly
withered.28 - Most jrisdictions have since promulgated one -of the
types of survival acts previously mentioned which allows the per-
sonal representatve. of the deceased to prosecute to judgment any
action the decedent might have maintained during his life. The
majority of the states with survival statutes do not distinguish be-
tweeii actions for fatal and non-fatal injuries; that is, their statutes
are broad enough to allow the decedent's representative to prose-
cute any action the decedent might have maintained. As might be
anticipated, however, some jurisdictions do differentiate between
actions or add variations.2 9
Basically a true survival statute merely continues the action the
decedent might have maintained at his death. A survival-death
statute includes decedent's action, but expands the possible recovery
by allowing the jury to consider injuries to his estate that have
arisen by reason of death3 0 Because it is the injury to decedent, and
perhaps his estate, which is at issue, the measure of damages should
be fashioned without reference to the needs and expectations of a
family or beneficiaries. Compensation for the injuries might thus in-
clude damages for decedent's pam and suffering,31 his medical ex-
27 The original English act did not provide for maintaining a cause of action
if the tortfeasor died. Today most jurisdictions provide by statute or court decision
that an action may be maintained if the tortfeasor died after the death of the injured
party. E.g., CAL. Civ. PROcFDuRE CODE § 385 (West 1954), Owo R v. CoDE ANN. §
2125.01 (Page 1954). See also Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955). Some
jurisdictions reach a similar result if the tortfeasor dies before or simultaneously
with the injured party, CAL. CIV. PROCEDURE CODE. § 385r (West 1954); Hnrrson v.
Weisbrod, 358 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. App. 1962)
28 It is impossible to construe the original English act as a survival act. Although
the first-section of the statute is apparently broad enough to include such an action,
paragraph two limits the coverage to certain family members without whose exstence
the action cannot be maintained.
29 Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Creekmore, 193 Ark. 722, 102 SAg.2d 553 (1937). held
that there could be no action when death was instantaneous. See also VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 1453 (1958) which states that there may be no action unless it was pending
at the time of death of either party. IND. ANN. STAT. 2-403 (Burns 1967) is an example
of a statute winch apparently provides for a survival action only if it is to prosecute
for non-fatal injuries.
30 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-280 and 52-555 (West 1958).
31 Coulson v. Shirks Motor Express Corp., 48 Del. 561, 107 A.2d 922 (1954);
Campbell v. Romanos, 346 Mass. 361, 191 N.E2d 764 (1963). Skoda v. West Penn
Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963)
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penses3 2 and those earnings lost from the time of injury until
death.38 If it is an expanded survival act (survival-death), funeral
expenses34 and probable future earnings will also be considered.
The loss of earnings element in a survival-death act requires
further clarification because there are three situations in which
the problem will arise. First, if the action revived is not for the
injury which caused death, the jury may award loss of earnings only
until death actually occurred from the independent cause. The
jury, of course, cannot be allowed to speculate about probable life
expectancy when a definite moment in time has been established
by the death. Second, if the injury did cause death, the revived
survival-death action should conceptually include a consideration of
loss of earnings based on life expectancy prior to the injury. As can
be seen, the argument that life expectancy has in fact been estab-
lished by death is not appropriate here and begs the question. It is
the injury in question which has shortened the anticipated life ex-
pectancy, and it is the task of the jury to determine future earnings
based on previous life expectancy. Indeed, this is the result reached
in those states which have substituted a survival-death action as the
exclusive remedy upon death. Such states have abolished Lord Camp.
bell-type acts in favor of the combination survival-death acts.86 The
measure of damages is generally ascertained by considering the loss
the estate has suffered, even though the act may provide for distri-
bution of the proceeds to statutory beneficiaries.80 Louisiana and
Maine, however, measure damages by looking to the losses the bene.
ficiaries have suffered even though their statutes are otherwise in the
form of a survival-death act.3 7
The third situation arises when the injury has caused the de-
cedent's death and the jurisdiction has both a survival-death and a
wrongful death act, and allows them to be prosecuted concurrently.
If each could be pursued to judgment without reference to the
other, a duplication of damages would result, thereby penalizing
the defendant by awarding damages in excess of actual injury.38
32 Coulson v. Shirks Motor Express Corp., 48 Del. 561, 107 A.2d 922 (1954); Skoda
v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963). See also authorities cited
supra note 12.
33 -Id., See also Allen v. Burdette, 66 Ohio App. 236, 32 N.E.2d 852 (1940).
34 See supra note 12.
35 CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. § 45-280 (West 1958); N.H. Ruv. STATS. § 556-12
(1967); Butler v. Steck, 146 Conn. 114, 148 A.2d 246 (1959).
36 See N.H. REv. STARS. § 556-14 (1967).
37 See LA. STAs. ANN. art. 2315; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 2501 (1964).
38 For a complete analysis of the double recovery problem, see Schumacher,
Rights of Action under Death and Survival Statutes, 233 Micu. L. REV. 114 (1924);
Note, 44 HARV. L. Rv. 980 (1931).
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For example, many jurisdictions provide that loss of earnings under
a survival-death statute are measured by aggregating the gross earn-
ings decedent expected and subtracting what would have been his
personal expenses had he lived. The result is his net earnings. Ob-
viously, if a wrongful death action were subsequently prosecuted
the measure of anticipated contributions from the decedent to sur-
vivors, a normal measurement under a wrongful death act, would
include a substantial portion of what had already been collected
through a survival-death action as the net earnings of decedent. To
avoid this duplication, the states judicially provide that loss of
earnings may be considered only until the date of death under a sur-
vival-death action.3 9 The effect of this judicial manipulation is to
alter survival-death acts so that they become true survival acts for
purposes of deciding a particular case. All damages which arose
prior to decedent's death are awarded to the estate, but both the
measure and distribution of damages sustained by reason of death
itself go to the beneficiaries designated by the jurisdiction's wrong-
ful death act. This arbitrary assignment of date of death as the point
in time at which damages are split between the estate and survivors
necessarily affects someone's interests. The victims in this instance
are supposedly the creditors of the estate, who are usually precluded
from sharing directly in damages which flow to survivors.40 This,
however, assumes that beneficiaries of the decedent are not liable to
decedent's creditors. Since the principal beneficiary is most often
the surviving spouse, it is questionable whether creditors are in
fact inequitably treated. That is to say, debts of large amounts are
usually debts of both spouses, and the death of one still leaves the
survivor liable. Thus, even though the creditors are prohibited
from sharing proceeds with beneficiaries directly, it is often likely
that they will realize what is owed to them through the surviving
spouse.
B. Measuring Damages Under Survival Acts
In computing damages in either a wrongful death or survival
action, the phrase "reduced to present worth" will often appear.
This is simply a recognition that the lump sum awarded to a bene-
ficiary or an estate is worth more than if it had come in piece-meal
during future years. The sum can be invested by the claimants and
that portion of the principal representing future earnings will return
39 Duffey, The faldistibution of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 0111o ST. L.J.
264, 268 (1958).
40 See, eg., D.C. CoDE § 16-2703 (1967).
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interest until it is consumed, This interest, of course, is income
which would not have been realized if decedent had lived to con-
tribute annual earnings which would have been used immediately
by the beneficiaries. The court must therefore instruct the jury
that the sum awarded is to be based upon that combination of
principal and interest which would equal decedent's probable future
contributions. 41 In this way the tortfeasor receives a credit for the
investment returns so that the amount he is obligated to pay will
equal the losses suffered and no more. The mechanics of discounting
by use of a chosen percentage for a period equal to decedent's life
expectancy may be further explored by referring to the article
cited.42
1. Loss of Earnings
If the survival action includes damages which arise by reason
of death, a great part of any recovery will be for extinguished earn-
ing capacity of the decedent. Three theories have been developed
for measuring this loss:
(1) The probable worth of decedent's future net earnings had
he lived to his normal life expectancy. To attain this figure,
- what would have been his personal expenses are deducted
from his probable gross earnings.
(2) The present worth of decedent's probable future savings
had he lived to' normal life expectancy. Probable personal ex-
penses and family expenditures are both subtracted from prob.
able gross earnings.
(3) The present worth of decedent's future gross earnings, No
expenses are deducted from the award computed.
The last cited formula, total gross earnings, has one great at-
tribute: it is simple. But it is also an unintelligent approach and is
seldom used.48 There is little justification for demanding that a de-
fendant pay for personal expenses that a decedent will never realize.
The result of this approach is to award a combination punitive-
compensatory recovery which is in fact neither, since it only par-
tially levies exemplary damages by assessing costs which will not
materialize, while otherwise purporting to measure probable earn-
ings.
41 The jury usually has mathematical tables to assist them in these computa-
tions. See SpxisFR, § 8:5 for examples of such aids.
42 Leasure, How to Prove Reduction to Present Worth, 21 0no ST. L.J. 204
(1960).
43 For examples of application of this formula, see Michael v. Western & Atl.
R.R., 175 Ga. 1, 165 S.E. 57 (1932); Lexington Utilities Co. v. Parker's Adm'r. 166 Ky.
81, 178 S.W. 1173 (1915).
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The second formula, anticipated savings, presents the most
theoretically accurate method for measuring loss of earnings, 4
Every expenditure decedent might have had during his life is
deducted from expected gross earnings. The remainder is awarded
to the estate as damages. Recalling that the theory of a survival-
death action, as pertains to future earnings, is to compensate the
estate without reference to any beneficiaries, this formula most near-
ly approximates the bounty which would have flowed by will or in-
testacy from decedent at the termination of a normal life expect-
ancy. The theory is often attacked, however, because it neglects to
consider the dependents of decedent who have lost their means of
support.45 In other words, its critics implore the courts to deliver
from blunder those legislatures which have failed to provide other-
wise for the expectations of beneficiaries. This situation arises, of
course, when the legislature has stipulated that survival-death actions
are the exclusive means of litigating a death action. The ambition
of the critics is both noble and worthwhile, but one should be hesi-
tant to so manipulate apparent legislative desires. If a legislature
wanted a wrongful death act to compensate beneficiaries for their
losses, it would presumably have acted accordingly. Renovation of
disliked legislation by way of boldly inaccurate administration is
seldom a successful way to accomplish needed change.
The most popular way to measure loss of earnings under a sur-
vival act, and the one favored by critics of the second method, is the
first theory, the present worth of decedents probable future net
earnings. The formula deducts from gross earnings only what would
have been decedent's personal expenses and disregards probable
expenditures for dependents. The remainder is awarded as damages
to the estate.40 The courts which' use this formula reason that it is
appropriate because, after deducting personal expenses, the amount
left is presumably what decedent would have expended on his bene-
ficiaries and dependents or left to them at his death. The adherents
to this method also argue that it is proper to use because it is similar
to the recovery which would be realized under a wrongful death
action and recognizes the needs of dependents.47 The approach,
however, only partially reflects a normal wrongful death recovery.
44 For examples of application of the second formula, see Lampe v. Lagomarcno-
Grupe Co., 251 Iowa 204, 100 N.W.2d 1 (1959); Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 67 Fla.
101, 64 So. 504 (1914).
45 2 F. HARER & F. JA.mEs, ToRs, § 25.15 (1956); Spsm, § 3:53, at 250.
40 Gonyer v. Russell, 160 F. Supp. 537 (D. R.I. 1958); Bryant v. Woodlief, 252
N.C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
47 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmsS, ToRTs, § 25.15 (1956); Speiser § 3:53, at 250.
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There is no way to include compensation for the loss of services to
dependents, or award damages for non-pecuniary losses such as the
value of decedent's companionship. Thus, the theory cannot be a
substitute for a wrongful death action, and any operation which is
to attempt precise recognition of the losses that family members
suffer must still be accomplished by the legislature.
2. Funeral Expenses
Many jurisdictions provide by statute that funeral expenses are
recoverable in a survival-death action in that this cost is usually a
debt of the estate.48 Courts often reach the same result without legis-
lative encouragement. 40 There is, however, contrary authority which
reasons that the estate would have been burdened ultimately with
the expense at any rate, so that it is not fair to levy this charge on
the tortfeasor.50 Using this approach, the only cost to the defendant
should be the small amount the estate has lost by having to pay the
expense prematurely, i.e., it is the "reduced to present worth" theory
in reverse. Obviously a defendant might argue that the premature
payment loss should be offset in his favor by considering evidence on
inflationary trends. It is not common to discover this kind of bicker-
ing, however, simply because of the comparatively insignificant
amount involved.
3. Medical Expenses
Survival acts usually provide that medical expenses incurred by
decedent are recoverable. The measure used will be the same as
that applied to non-death cases in the jurisdiction.
4. Pain and Suffering
Most states provide that the estate may recover for the pain and
suffering which the decedent endured. 5' The theory is logically cor-
rect because the action is merely a continuation of decedent's rights.
However, some jurisdictions have seemingly recognized that damages
for pain and suffering probably exist to provide a balm for one who
has experienced agony and lived to remember it. They therefore
48 See, e.g.,M. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 112 (1957).
49 Baker v. Salvation Army, 91 N.H. 1, 12 A.2d 514 (1940).
50 Brady v. Haw, 187 Iowa 501, 174 N.W. 331 (1919).
51 Coulson v. Shirks Motor Express Corp., 48 Del. 561, 107 A.2d 922 (1954);
Campbell v. Romanos, 346 Mass. 361, 191 N.E.2d 764 (1963); Fielder v. Ohio Edison
Co., 158 Ohio St. 375, 109 N.E2d 855 (1952); Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pit.
323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963). See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2553 (1964) which
specifically allows pain and suffering damages.
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disallow pain and suffering compensation in a survival action 52
because the torment of decedent is gone with his death, and it re-
quires too fabricated a justification to vindicate the recovery as a
loss suffered by the estate. Pain and suffering damages will never-
theless continue to be awarded in most jurisdictions because they
are conceptually acceptable; they are probably enmeshed with
thoughts of punishing the defendant, and perhaps allow the jury
to express its regard for the anguish of relatives.
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH AcTiONS
Wrongful death statutes patterned after Lord Campbell's Act
have been adopted in most states. They are primarily designed to
compensate designated beneficiaries who have lost their means of
support by the premature death of a person who has theretofore pro-
vided their principal income. However, the legislatures and courts
also recognize and attempt to compensate for other pecuniary in-
juries beneficiaries have suffered, as when death strikes a wife or
child who did not contribute direct financial support.
The previously mentioned adherence to Lord Campbell's Act
by United States legislatures has perpetuated several problems. The
English act simply allowed the jury to award damages proportionate
to the injury.5 3 American legislatures provide equally vague instruc-
tions, suggesting that the liability to tortfeasors and the award to
the beneficiaries be "fair and just"15 4 "proportionate to the injury"' 5
or "under all the circumstances may be just."150 Juries are thus em-
powered with great discretion as to what they consider to be a fair
award, although they must act under the scrutiny of trial court and
appellate review, and occasionally within minimum and maximum
limits determined by the legislature. 57 Further control of the juries
is often imposed by the courts and legislatures which state that only
the pecuniary losses which beneficiaries have suffered may be con-
sidered. For example, the jury is always empowered to compute
the value of decedent's services, even though these kinds of contri-
butions are received in a form other than money. The value of serv-
52 Indiana (INn. ANN. STAT. § 2-403 (Bums 1967)) excludes these damages by
specifying the only damages which may be awarded. AMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-477
(1956) and CAL. CIV. PROCEDURE CODE § 573 (West 1954) specifically exclude pain and
suffering.
53 "Mhe Jury may give such Damages as they may think proportioned to the
Injury resulting from such Death...
54 MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1965).
55 TEx. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 4677 (1952).
56 UTAH CODE ANN. 78-11-7 (1953).
57 Thirteen states provide maximums: See SPmSaa, § 7:2.
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ices can be measured by looking at, the cost of' substitute services
or the market value of a particular task decedent regularly per-
formed. However, the jury is often precluded from awarding dam-
ages for the lost companionship of decedent or the anguish the
beneficiaries have suffered, because there is no accurate way in
which to measure' these losses. It is said that they are "non-pecu-
niary" in nature and beyond valuation. This restriction on non-
pecuniary losses, too, sifted down to the present directly from the
original English death act. Blake v. Midland,"8 decided shortly after
the Act was promulgated, interpreted the general language of the
statute, as including only pecuniary losses. Most United States juris-
dictions adopted that ruling in their courts and legislatures.50 How-
ever, as indicated above, the states are in unanimous agreement
that the pecuniary value of lost services such as training and moral
guidance 0 which decedent might have rendered is included.01
Some jurisdictions even permit the ,jury to judge and award the
pecuniary worth of such items as the value of decedent's society,
companionship and attention.( 2 Other jurisdictions have gone even
farther and have completely rejected the pecuniary loss ,rule in al-
lqwing awards for the mental anguish and suffering of the bene-
ficiaries.63 ,
A. Measuring Damages Under Wrongful Death Acts
1. Financial Contributions
<Contributions for support and maintenancd 'that decedent might
have been' expected to give to beneficiaries will often form a sub-
stantial portion of a wrongful death award. This will be especially
true if the decedent was the family wage earner or if the jurisdic-
tion has adopted a strict "pecuniary damages only" attitude.
58 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
59 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Gulf, Colo. & S. F. R,R.
v. Farmer, 102 Tex. 235, 115 S.W. 260 (1909). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909
(1963); ILL. Rlv. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1963); OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Page
1953).
60 See, e.g., Vines v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 232 Ark. 173, 337 S.W.2d 722
(1960); Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267, 124 N.EY.2d 505 (1955).
61 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625 (1915); Rogow v, U.S. 173 F.
Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
62 Bower v. Brannon, 141 W.Va. 435, 90 S.E.2d 342 (1955). See also the leading
case of Wycko v. Gnootke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960), although .the case
is more notable for expressing the "lost investment" theory.
63 Statutes: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1963); FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1965); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1964). See also Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 87 $.E.2d
629 (1955); Kelley v. Ohio River R.R., 58 W.Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520 (1905).
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Two methods are used to calculate lost support payments to
survivors:
(1) Decedent's probable future personal expenses are deducted
from his probable future gross income and the remainder is re-
duced to present worth and awarded as lost contributions6 4
(2) Actual contributions of the decedent are calculated and ag-
gregated based on life expectancy.
The first method is applied more often but can be criticized
if the court fails to consider that a portion of what decedent con-
tributed to his dependents was returned to him in kind.65 He prob-
ably consumed part of the food in the home, shared the family
dwelling and automobile, and otherwise benefited from family ex-
penditures. However, a simple mathematical approach will not cor-
rect the deficiency. For example, a family consisting of only a hus-
band and wife may have shared an expensive apartment, but it
would be unfair to the survivor to hold the tortfeasor liable for only
half of the future rent. The survivor should not have to move to a
smaller apartment or find a tenant to share the costs of the living
quarters. One purpose of a wrongful death award should be to in-
sure that the survivor is able to maintain the standard of living to
which he or she has been accustomed. Whether the courts consider
these problems of joint and apportionable expenses is not often as-
certainable from the reports. However, it may be conjectured that
the courts which use the first method will approve an award by the
jury where only those expenses which were obviously personal and
individual have been deducted.00 There are several reasons why this
simplistic approach is not often successfully challenged: (1) The
jury may have a difficult task even determining what are purported-
ly obvious personal expenses (e.g., decedent made regular purchases
of tools which he used in home repairs, but woodworking was also
his hobby). (2) It allows the jury to at least reflect and continue
the survivor's current standard of living. (3) It precludes intoler-
able delay which might be caused if there was an insistence on exact
mathematical calculations. That is, the demands of crowded court
dockets prevail at some point over the desire for exactness.
The second method is used when decedent has been contribut-
64 O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959), interpreting Okla-
homa law. Note that this formula was seen in the discussion concerning survi%al acts
as the preferred way to measure losses to the estate.
65 Id. See also the criticisms in Dowell Inc. v. Jowers, 166 F.2d 214 (5th ir.
1948).
66 Wawrzyn v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 10 Ill. App. 2d 394, 135 N.E.2d 154 (1956).
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ing easily ascertainable sums to certain beneficiaries.0 7 Once the ap-
propriate figure is determined, the only remaining task is to decide
whether and for how long the payments would have continued if
decedent had lived. This entails a consideration of the donee's life
expectancy and of the decedent's life expectancy prior to the injury
which caused death. 6 At a maximum, the award should reflect a
continuation of payments only for the shorter of the life expectan-
cies of donor and donee. 9 The anticipated period for which dona-
tions might have continued may also be shortened by other evidence
which indicates that decedent would have stopped future payments.
Use of method two is also popular when the court is asked to
determine the probable contributions of a wealthy decedent. Busi-
ness expenses may become so entangled with personal expenses that
practical separation becomes impossible. Moreover, experience
should suggest that even after deducting his expenses, a decedent
earning large amounts of money does not use all of the remainder
to support his family. Substantial amounts may be invested while
fairly constant amounts are contributed directly to the family. The
objective of the approach is still to determine probable contribu-
tions, but the focus turns more to the past standard of living of the
beneficiaries in an attempt to reach an accurate result.70 As will be
discussed in a later section, the survivors may still realize the bene-
fits of decedent's probable future investments and savings by claim-
ing from the defendant what would have been their inheritance at
decedent's normal life expectancy.
2. Loss of Services
The death of a family member denies to the survivors some
services which the decedent had previously performed, and many
of them are measureable in terms of pecuniary value. The task of
measuring the loss is often more complicated than calculating lost
support payments, for there is no basic dollar figure from which to
begin. Nevertheless, abundant aids are available to litigants from
which reasonable estimates can be gathered to measure the value of
the more common services rendered to family members.7 1
67 Circle Line Sightseeing Yachts, Inc. v. Storbeck, 325 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1963).
68 Renaldi v. New York, N.H.&H. R.R., 280 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1956).
69 Baltimore Transit Co. v. State ex rel. Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 71 A.2d 442
(1950).
70 O'Toole v. United States, 242 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1957).
71 See, e.g., Page, 'Pecuniary' Damages for Wrongful Death, in TRIAL LAwER's
GUIDF: 1963 ANNUAL 398 (J. Kennelly & J. Chapman ed.); Kierr, Proof of Damages
Arising from the Death of a Housewife, 8 LA. BAR. J. 215 (1961). The many cases re-
ported also provide guides for estimating these losses. See, e.g., Smith v. Whldden, 87
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More thorough consideration of specific services will be dealt
with in sections following. However, consideration is most often
given to the value of services performed by a child,72 by a wife as
mother and housewife,7 3 and by a father or mother as the primary
source of education and guidance to children.7 4
The cost of the replacement of the service is the criterion used
to measure the damages,75 and the amount is often quite substantial:
40,000 dollars to two children for the loss of their father's services;76
98,838 dollars for the lost services of a wife-mother not including
25,000 dollars to the husband for loss of consortium; 7 46,059 dollars
to the family for loss of a wife-mother.7 8
3. Loss of Companionship
A majority of United States jurisdictions decline to consider
injuries to beneficiaries which are not measureable in terms of dollar
losses.79 The companionship, affection and consortium which a de-
cedent might have bestowed on survivors are usually considered to
be in this category of immeasureable losses. Paradoxically, these
same jurisdictions which deny companionship and consortium losses
in wrongful death actions display no hesitancy in awarding pain and
suffering damages to an estate in a survival action, 0 and are equal-
ly cooperative in allowing damages for loss of consortium in a tort
injury action.81 The explanation generally set forth for denying dam-
So.2d 42 (Fla. 1956); Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267, 124 N.E2d 505
(1955); Pennell v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 13 Ill. App. 2d 433, 142 N.E2d 497 (1957).
72 da Silva v. J.M. Martinac Shipbuilding Corp., 153 Cal. App. 2d 397, 314 P.2d
598 (1957); Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club. Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357
(1963).
73 Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-Pitts. Motor Express, 896 Pa. 482, 153 A2d 490 (1959).
74 Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959): Kramer v. Portland-
Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953).
75 Spangenberg, Proof of Damages for Wrongful Death, § 3.6 in WOscFUL DEATH
AND SURavIvoRsmP, (Beall ed. 1958).
76 Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
77 Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
78 Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-Pitts. Motor Express. 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490
(1959).
79 See Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1958), which reviews the thinking
supporting this idea. See also MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1965); Oi1o REV. COD. AN.N. §
2125.02 (Page 1953).
80 See authorities cited note 51 supra.
81 An excellent example of this confusion may be seen in Georgia which allows
consortium loss only until death, but found such a loss where decedent lived for
only 2 hours after the initial injury. Walden v. Coleman, 105 Ga. App. 242, 124 S.E.2d
313 (1962).
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ages for'lo of'society ando'companionshi in wrongful death actions
is that the injurieS are incaable of measutemeit, and that the jury
migfii llow rh s~sympatheic' feelings for survivors to guide them.82
There-may' be merit to thbse arguments, but they are no less, ap-
plicable to the pain and'suffering and consortium'awards mentioned
ab6Vce. A better explanation might be that the jury has been given
a "broad measdre, of 'discretion by statute, yet the courts and legisla-
tures'believe that this 'freedom must be tempered,'for proof of this
kind'of injury is difficult to present without arousing passions, and
the enormity of' loss by death would tax even'the wise man who
might be asked to value the worth of a friend and companion.
Some jurisdictions which are ostensibly guided by the pecuniary
loss rule nevertheless manage to discover such value in the com-
panionship or affection'i which decedent bestowed on survivors. 88
Perhaps one does not buy companionship and' affection so that the
reasoning of these court' is 'technically unimpeachable. But if it
is determined that the* loss of society is injurious and, though in-
tangible, not fanciful, logic similarly might direct that replace.
ment be attempted by way of financial awards. A growing number
of states candidly recognize that the loss of companionship is not
strictly a pecuniary damage; -yet compensate for the injury never-
theless with the only thin" available-financial awards. 84
4. Anguish of Survivors
Only a few jurisdictions attempt to compensate for the pain
and sorrow the beneficiaries have suffered by reason of the decedent's
death"" Even those jurisdictions which are prone to recognize the
injury suffered by loss of companionship, and which struggle to
reason that it is a pecuniary injury, balk at compensating for the
grief of survivors. One commentator reasons that "the distinction be-
tween the pain of a broken arm and the pain of a broken heart is
judge-made . ",6 but it is a distinction which almost all of the
i
82 O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959) (interpreting Oklahoma
law); 'Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1958).
83 Wycko v. Gnootke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Fussner v. Andert,
261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-Pltts. Express, 896
Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
84 Gulf Transport Co. v. Allen, 209 Miss. 206, 46 So. 2d 436 (1950); Basham v.
Terry, 199 Va. 817, 102 S.E.2d 285 (1958); Gustafson v. Bertschinger, 12 Wise. 2d 680,
108 N.W.2d 273 (1961).
85 ,Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1070, 4 So. 91 (1903); Matthels
v. Hicks,-197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955).
86 Spangenberg, supra note 75 § 3.2, at 65.
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states have chosen to upholLS7 Thhieality of wounded feelings is
probably as susceptible to measurement as vanished companionship,
but it is not an item traditionally consiq'ered in court actions of any
kind. The criticisms that mighlt be leveled at the attempts to com-
pensate for loss of companionship, however, ire also appropriate in
this area of anguish of survivors. There is probably a logical dif-
ference in that companionship focuses on the dissolved relationship
while considerations of anguish concentrate on the bereaved sur-
vivor's singular suffering. Yet the difference for' the purposes of
measuring damages is rather artificial. Nevertheless, the majority
rule abides with unwavering vigor, and it can be aiticipated that
it will remain firm even while these jurisdictions move steadily to-
ward compensating for loss of companionship.
5. Medical Expenses
The states appear to be almost evenly split concerning the
question of whether beneficiaries should recover the medical ex-
penses which decedent incurred. Perhaps a slight majority hold that
they are not recoverable because-they are not an expense which
has arisen by reason of decedent's death.88 The wording of many
statutes would seem to dictate this result in that they generally limit
damages to those "injuries resulting from such death."8 9 However,
some statutes specifically allow the recovery of medical expenses' 0
and other state courts approve this kind of award, especially if the
statutory beneficiary is liable for payment of the medical bills.9 1
6. Funeral Expenses
In the discussion of survival acts, it was noted that there is dis-
agreement concerning the charging of funeral costs to a wrongdoer.
The same arguments are equally applicable in discussing wrongful
death cases, and there is a similar split of authority as to whether
they should be awarded as damages. A few states deny recovery for
burial costs, 92 but the majority holds that they are a direct result of
the tortfeasor's act and are recoverable from him.9 3
87 See, e.g, MiesKe v. Public Utility Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 871, 259 P.2d 647 (1953);
O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959).
88 Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 CaL 2d 1, 271 P.2d 34 (1954).
-89 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1959).
90 See, e.g., GA. CoDiE A . § 105-1310 (1956).
91 Langford v. Ritz Taxicab Co., 172 Neb. 153, 109 N.W.2d 120 (1961); Orcult v.
Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961).
92 Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 60 N.J.L. 444, 38 A. 759 (1897).
93 Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961); Shield v. County of
Buffalo, 161 Neb. 34, 71 N.W.2d 701 (1955). See also ConN. GEN. STATs. § 45.280
(1958); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 331.04 (1958). See also Luis v. Cavin, 88 Cal. App. 2d 107,
198 P.2d 563 (1948).
1968] ,
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
7. Inheritance
If adequate proof is offered to demonstrate that decedent would
have accumulated some wealth at normal life expectancy, and if the
evidence can also show that the estate would have passed to the
statutory beneficiaries either by will or intestacy, most jurisdictions
allow the jury to award damages representing the amount. Some
older cases are reported which deny the recovery of possible in-
heritance, but a close inspection of the court's reasoning indicates
that the inadequacy of proof is what prompted them to refuse the
award.94 The beneficiaries forfeited nothing anyhow, if the jurisdic-
tion calculated loss of contributions by using the net earnings
theory. That is, if a court directed that lost contributions be calcu-
lated by taking decedent's expected gross income, deducting his prob-
able personal expenses and awarding the remainder, nothing would
be left from which to accumulate savings from which an inheritance
could flow. By definition, the net earnings theory directs that all
funds which would have remained after decedent's personal expenses
should be awarded to his family. Therefore, if the decedent had
only an average income, the final award to beneficiaries equals the
same amount whether the total is derived by adding possible in-
heritance to actual contributions or lumping the amount as prob.
able net earnings. Nevertheless, the method is haphazard and should
not be fostered, especially if the decedent was wealthy and could
have been expected to accumulate some savings after deducting fam-
ily and personal expenses. 95
O'Toole v. United States9 presents a graphic, well reasoned
discussion of loss of inheritance damages. The court there recog-
nized that consideration of possible inheritance is speculative, but
also noted that it is no more so than other considerations which
make up major portions of death damages.97 The decision is per-
haps most cited because the court of appeals remanded the case to
the trial court for consideration of loss of inheritance damages, even
though there had already been an award of 470,000 dollars to the
widow. The decision thereby makes severe incursions into the idea
propounded by some courts and legislatures that death awards
94 Mobile & 0. R.R. v. Williams, 219 Ala. 238, 121 So. 722 (1929), Baker v.
Slack, 319 Mich. 703, 30 N.W.2d 403 (1948).
95 See Wawryszyn v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 10 Il1. App. 2d 394, 135 N.E.2d 14
(1956), where probable expenses were deducted from anticipated gross income and
there was therefore nothing to accumulate.
96 242 F.2d 308 (3rd Cir. 1957).
97 Id. at 312.
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should be limited; evidence notwithstanding, a very high award is
probably excessive. 98 Later federal decisions have followed O'Toole
in holding that loss of probable inheritance is a proper element
of damages in wrongful death actions.90 Some state courts which
had been reluctant to award lost inheritance, or shy to approve
high awards, will hopefully be influenced by the reasoning of these
federal decisions.
B. Death of Husband and Father (Head of Family)
This portion of the discussion will focus on the typical situa-
tion where the wage earner and head of the family is a man. Nu-
merous cases arise, however, where a woman is the sole provider
and family head, as when the husband is disabled or deceased. In
those situations, the measure of damages will be ascertained by
combining the elements of losses considered under this section and
those set out in the subsequent section, death of a wife.
As was discussed in preceding sections, the surviving wife is
entitled to receive the value of probable contributions the decedent
might have made, the pecuniary value of services he might have
rendered, lost inheritance, and, in some jurisdictions, compensation
for lost companionship, the survivor's anguish, and reimbursement
for medical and funeral expenses.
As was also pointed out earlier, both the life expectancy of the
decedent and survivors must be determined to calculate lost contri-
butions. The shorter of the life expectancies is used to reflect the
maximum period for which pecuniary losses have been suffered.1 00
Mortality tables may be used to assist the jury in determining life
expectancy, but they are not conclusive. 10' Evidence of health and
habits of the deceased may be used by the jury to compose a longer
or shorter expectancy than the average set forth in the tables. -02
The determination of lost contributions also entails reasoned
speculation as to decedent's future potential as a wage earner, had
he lived. His earning status immediately prior to death is certainly
relevant, but the object of the evidence must be to determine po-
tential earning capacity. It is the conjectured losses of contributions
98 Comment, 20 NACCA LJ. 256, 257 (1957).
99 Martin v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 268 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1959); National
Airline, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
100 See Whitaker v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 296 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1961); Mon-
tellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 884 (EJD.N.Y. 1962).
101 Steinbrunner v. Pittsburgh & W. R.R., 146 Pa. 504, 23 A. 259 (1892).
102 Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Dcl. 1963); Gordy v.
Powell, 95 Ga. App. 822, 99 S.E.2d 313 (1957).
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in the future which the award must reflect, and not simply multiply-
ing present earnings by the number of years he was expected to
live. Decedent's physical condition, work habits, education and op-
portunities for promotion should be considered.108 If the decedent
was a student or trainee, his performance in school is relevant.
His chosen vocation itself must be studied to determine trends in
pay and the requirements of the economy for personnel working
in that specialty. In brief, decedent's life expectancy itself is not
particularly meaningful unless and until supporting evidence is
introduced to portray his potential as a wage earner. The use of
expert testimony and assistance in this area is rapidly becoming
imperative if counsel are to adequately represent their clients.10 4
In connection with earning capacity considerations, the courts
should insist that counsel for beneficiaries delineate between the life
expectancy and the work expectancy of the decedent.105 If decedent
was elderly, evidence that his capacity to earn was decreasing should
be admitted and given appropriate weight.100 This consideration be-
comes more important each year as labor unions make steady strides
in decreasing mandatory retirement ages for wage earners. Should
the court correctly insist on the differentiation, plaintiff's counsel
should be permitted to introduce evidence of pension plans or other
old age payment plans under which the decedent might have bene-
fited.107
Children are usually included as beneficiaries under a wrong-
ful death act and the general considerations governing awards for
contributions, inheritance and companionship are equally appro-
priate. Life expectancy of children is usually not at issue, but the
question of whether anticipated contributions from decedent should
be calculated for only a child's minority period has been bothersome
to the courts. Most courts refuse to arbitrarily decide that contribu-
tions from the decedent would have automatically ceased at major-
103 Johns v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 143 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Geary v.
Metropolitan Street Ry., 73 App. Div. 441, 77 N.Y.S. 54 (1902).
104 Merrill v. United Air Lines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 704 (SD.N.Y. 1959). See also
Eden, For More Adequate Measurement of Impaired Earning Capacity and Medical
Care Costs of the Injured, Trial and Tort Trends, 62 BELLI SEMINAR, 257.
105 See Immel, Actuarial Tables and Damage Awards, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 240 (1958);
Krohl & Wolfe, Work-Life Expectancy, 26 INs. COUNS. J. 190 (1959).
100 See generally Eden, The Use of Economists and Statisticians in Impaired
Earning Capacity Cases, 10 PRAc. LAwYER 23 (Mar. 1964). See also Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Gilbert, 206 Ark. 683, 178 S.W.2d 73 (1944).
107 See discussion in Kowtko v. Delaware & Hudson R.R., 131 F. Supp. 95 (M.D.
Pa. 1955).
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ity.108 However, a few do apparently regard minority as the maxi-
mum period which may be considered. 10 9
Loss of services is especially appropriate for consideration in
determining damages to surviving children. The courts devote
great care in attempting to determine at least the commercial value
of services which have been lost by the death of the parent.110 Esti-
mated cost of replacement is again relevant in determining the
worth of the nurture, training and guidance which the child has
lost, but the evidence required to support the award is often less
demanding than in some other damage areas." 1 Generally, however,
successful litigants introduce evidence to show that the parent was
not only qualified to give productive guidance, 12 but did in fact
provide training, attention and devotion to the child's welfare.18
C. Death of a Wife or Mother
A 1959 edition of American Home magazine listed twenty-one
major tasks that a housewife accomplishes each week." 4 The time
devoted to these jobs averaged over seventeen hours per day,115
and the survey concluded that the fair market value of these serv-
ices approached 800 dollars a month.
Combine these figures with a prevailing belief that it is a
hienous assault on family and society to take the life of a mother,
and one can generously appreciate the stirring decisions which ac-
company wrongful death actions involving the death of a wife or
mother: "Her price is far above rubies."" 06 "[The] companionship,
comfort, society, guidance, solace and protection which go into the
vase of family happiness-are the things for which a wrongdoer must
108 See, e.g., Lund v. Seattle, 163 Wash. 254, 1 P.2d 301 (1931).
109 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. State ex rel Trainor, 33 Md. 542 (1871).
110 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Montellier v. United
States, 202 F.Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952); Kramer v.
Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953).
331 The award in Aronson v. Everett, 136 Wash. 312, 239 P. 1011 (1925) was
apparently supported by nothing more than that most parents provide some worth-
while guidance to their children.
112 Norfolk & AV. Ry. v. Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625 (1915).
113 Rogow v. United States, 173 F.Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
114 AE.RCAN HosAE, Jan. 1959.
115 The hourly figure is somewhat misleading because hours were credited to
each task separately, although a woman often accomplishes two or three chores at
once, e.g., baking, child care and dishwvashing.
116 Dist. Judge Simpson in Legare v. United States, 195 F.Supp. 557, 561 (S.D.
Fla. 1961).
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pay when he shatters the vase."" 7 "This companionship . . . is
the necessity of life, as oxygen is to the air, to those who are tread-
ing the pathways of life in the later years of one's existence .... "118
If the above comments and excerpts were exaggerated, tongue
in cheek commentaries on this portion of the law of wrongful death,
they would serve no useful purpose on these pages. Understanding
the valuation process in determining the worth of a wife or mother,
however, requires some preliminary distillation of occasional syrupy
pronouncements. The tortfeasor's counsel must prepare to counter
the effect of tear-provoking jury pleas. The danger for a claimant's
attorney is even more pronounced, however, if he is lulled into a
dependency on sympathetic courts and juries. He will usually find
that the opinions launch into verse-like rhetoric only when empiri-
cal evidence supports the amount awarded.
It is not unusual to find that the decedent housewife was also
a wage earner on at least a part time basis. As pointed out in a prev-
ious section, if she did work outside of the home, evidence of the
damages the beneficiaries have suffered by the loss of her earnings
should be considered by the jury. The evidentiary requirements
should be approximately the same as were described in that section,
but may be complicated if the decedent worked outside of the home
only sporadically. That is, she may have held a semi-permanent posi-
tion but interrupted her career to bear and raise children. But,
this is only to say that the evidence must be convincing enough to
support an award for the lost earnings. The court should not re-
-ject consideration of these damages just because her work schedule
was irregular over the years.
When a woman has not generally been a breadwinner but,
rather, has devoted her energies to household tasks and care of her
family, the most substantial portion of the damages awarded will
be for the pecuniary value of her services to the beneficiaries. The
valuation process consists of isolating the jobs the decedent per-
formed in the household, determining the value of each by looking
to the replacement market, and computing the combined total as
damages. The use of expert testimony such as home economists and
employment specialists is invaluable once it has been determined
what work the decedent actually accomplished in the home.110 These
aids are practically meaningless, however, until the claimants pro-
117 Justice Musmanno in Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-Pitts. Motor Express, 896 Pa.
482, 485, 153 A.2d 490, 492 (1959).
118 Chief Judge Gourley in Fabrizi v. Griffin, 162 F.Supp. 276, 279 (W.D. Pa.
1958).
110 See SPEisER, §§ 4:8 and 4:9 for sample testimony by such specialists.
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vide proof of what and how this decedent performed. The award
cannot be based upon what an ideal housewife should do, or how
the average housewife accomplishes her work. Rather, the award
must reflect the pecuniary damages that the beneficiaries have suf-
fered by loss of this decedent's services. This warning was not con-
sidered necessary when considering the damages suffered by the loss
of a husband and wage earner, but there is some tendency to as-
sume that a decedent housewife performed all of the services she
was supposed to perform. 120
The age of decedent, her health and customary mode of per-
formance are again pertinent considerations in the attempt to com-
pute damages. These items were discussed in relation to the loss
of a husband and father and will not be elaborated upon further.
There is, however, another rather troublesome variable which is
often considered in assessing damages upon the death of a woman.
For want of a better description, it can be tentatively identified as
the "quality of devotion" with which the decedent performed her
work. The worth of this quality lies somewhere between the actual
replacement value of her services and the "price of rubies." It is
partially composed of what heretofore has been discussed as com-
panionship and society. But it is something more, as may be gath-
ered from the quotes at the beginning of this section. It is also an
item which concerns the courts to an almost inordinate degree. It
undoubtedly does so because the death of a mother creates an ob-
vious loss, but a partially incalculable one.' 2 ' The frugality of a
wife is more meaningful than the efficiency of a replacement econo-
mist; aspirin dispensed with empathy by a mother may be a greater
healant than the professional knowledge and sophisticated facilities
available to a resident registered nurse. The problem, of course, is
to assign a realistic value to this quality of devotion. As was seen
in previous sections, the handling of inestimable losses has troubled
the courts, and there is a definite split of authority as to their recog-
nition and disposition. Those jurisdictions which attempt to evalu-
ate the worth of companionship likewise award damages for the loss
120 For example, in Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952), the
court apparently allowed the jury to determine damages based upon their own
knowledge and judgment of what a housewife usually does. Even the well reasoned
Fabrizi opinion, 162 F. Supp. 276 (WI. Pa. 1958), is sprinkled with this vein of
writing, but perhaps may be disregarded because the evidence supported the award
and the utterances are only dicta.
121 See, generally Kierr, Proof of Damages Arising From the Death of a House-
wife, 8 LA. BAR. J. 215 (1961).
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of the security, guidance and devotion of a mother and wife.122
Those which deny such recoveries similarly reject consideration of
damages for the injuries realized by survivors by the loss of the
mother's devotion.
A husband may also recover damages for the loss he has suf-
fered if his decedent wife assisted him in his business or profession,
as, for example, acting as a part time secretary. 125 As has been seen,
the anguish of the husband and children is generally rejected as an
item completely beyond valuation.
Other damage items discussed in previous sections such as fun-
eral and medical expenses are equally relevant in this section and
will often form a part of the wrongful death award.
D. Death of a Child
Traditionally, it has been more economical for a wrongdoer
to kill an infant than an adult. If the administrator or executor is
suing under a loss-to-estate type statute (survival-death act), the
value of earnings the decedent might have accumulated during min-
ority must be deducted as belonging to his father or other guardi-
an.124 His projected earnings minus expenses after minority may
then be calculated, but the evidence becomes so speculative if an
attorney is arguing about income ten or fifteen years hence that
chances of a substantial recovery become nugatory.
The primary concern of this section, however, is loss-to-survivor
statutes. Their interpretation, too, usually precludes recovery of
substantial awards. As noted earlier, many jurisdictions have emu-
lated both the words of Lord Campbell's Act and the first opinions
interpreting it. This attitude has perpetuated the pre-eminence of
the "pecuniary damages only" rule.125 It has also stilted the judici-
ary because the courts use precedents established when children
worked outside of the home from a very early age. At the turn of
122 It may be guessed that it is the negligent killing of wives and mothers that
has initiated the trend towards attempting to value companionship and society. For
many years after Vreeland, there was little discussion of the worth of companionship
in the cases. Then, as wives became more active outside of the home and drove
automobiles regularly, the tragedy of their deaths became more vivid to the courts.
The opinions began to speak in terms of loss of society along with valuing the worth
of her more -tangible services. It appears that only then did the courts and litigants
renew their attempts at valuing the companionship upon the death of a man,
123 Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267, 124 N.E.2d 505 (1955).
124 Carney v. Concord Street R.R., 72 N.H. 364, 57 A. 218 (1903). See also Mt.
JuR. 2d, Death § 147 (1965).
125 American R.R. v. Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145 (1913); da Silva v. J. M. Martinac
Shipbuilding Corp., 153 Cal. App. 2d 397, 314 P.2d 598 (1957).
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the century, a child could bring money into the home by working
in a factory, or he provided valuable services in the then largely
rural America by attending to farm chores. That age has largely
passed for the majority of American children, but the formula for
measuring damages to parents still remains: the value of probable
services or contributions that the child would have rendered during
minority minus the probable expenses to the parents of rearing.1 26
As might be anticipated, if a court insists on a strict application of
the pecuniary loss test, the award to surviving parents will be nom-
inal. 27 The average child raised in an urban community would be
required to devote most of his waking hours out of school to running
errands, washing dishes and dusting furniture to match the expendi-
tures his parents will make for his education, medical expenses,
food and clothing. Nevertheless, a majority of jurisdictions pur-
portedly still use the loss of services method of valuation.
If the child was very young, the award is based on little more
than speculation by the jury. 28 As the child matures, however, evi-
dence of his habits, health, conduct and intelligence become rele-
vant considerations in determining the damages which the parents
have sustained, 2 9 and the jury has somewhat more justification for
making an award. Many jurisdictions hold that the jury may also
consider that the decedent minor might have rendered contribu-
tions and services after reaching majority.180 This application may
not be criticized if the evidence warrants the award,1 3 ' but may be
condemned if the jurisdiction arbitrarily uses it as a device to avoid
the harshness of the pecuniary loss rule - as for example, allowing
the jury to speculate that an infant would have rendered services
126 da Silva v. J. M. Martinac Shipbuilding Corp., 153 Cal. App. 2d 397, 314
P.2d 598 (1957); Brown v. Erie R.R., 87 NJ.L. 487, 91 A. 1023 (1914). For examples
of more recent decisions, see Georgia S. & F. R.R. v. Perry, 326 F.2d 921 (5th Cir.
1964) ; interpreting Florida law; Montellier v. United States, 202 F.Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y.
1962).
127 Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d 585 (1965), found no pecuniary
loss to parents whose retarded son had been killed and reversed the lowcr court's
award of damages.
128 De Ruiz v. Jack Rudy Trucking Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 609, 341 P.2d 388 (1959),
awarded $15,000 to the mother of an 8-month old child.
129 J. Paul Smith Co. v. Tipton, 237 Ark. 486, 374 S.W.2d 176 (1964); Gluckauf
v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357 (1963).
130 See, e.g., Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190
(1952); Flory v. New York Cent. R.Y., 170 Ohio St. 185 163 N.E.2d 902 (1959).
131 For example, there seems to have been adequate justification to award a
$12,000 recovery to the family of a 22-year old girl who had been contributing weekly
amounts to her family and paying some of their utility bills. Willman v. Jargon,
37 Ill. App. 2d 380, 185 N.E.2d 702 (1962).
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after he reached majority. Those jurisdictions which hold that dam-
ages for loss of services after minority may never be considered be.
cause of the speculative elements are equally arbitrary and not justi-
fied if the evidence dictates other results. 182
The states abide by their precedents established in death ac-
tions involving adults and generally prohibit awards based on the
grief and anguish suffered by the surviving parents. There is also
the same division of authority that was seen earlier concerning
awards for the loss of society and companionship. 188 As noted prev-
iously, the apparent trend is to recognize and award damages for
these latter losses which destroy the family relationship.
What was perhaps clumsily identified as the "quality of devo-
tion" of a wife and mother's services discussed in the immediately
preceding section carries* the nomenclature of "filial care and at-
tention"18 4 when discussing the death of a child. Perhaps it can
only be described as something other than the worth of tangible
services, but more than companionship.18 8 Whatever its name or
characteristics, it is often recognized as an item for which compen.
sation will be substituted.186 As with companionship, some juris-
dictions have even held that it is something to which a pecuniary
value can be assigned. More probably, it is another tool to obviate
the results which will attend if a jurisdiction must pay service to
the pecuniary loss rule. This conclusion is suggested because it is
the only plausible reasoning which supports the high awards whichi
have been granted for the death of children in recent years.187 Nat-
urally, some jurisdictions deny the jury the opportunity to consider
the loss of filial care, equating it with companionship and holding
both too intangible to measure in dollars.188
t82 This writer has found no recent decisions which strictly apply thig rule,
dicta to the contrary notwithstanding. See Annot, 14 A.L.R.2d 485 (1950).
188 Child cases: Tuffy v. Sioxus Transit Co., 69 S.D. 868, 10 N.V.2d
767 (1943) (denying recovery); Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal.2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1047)
(permitting recovery).
184 SPEisER § 4:19, at 830.
185 Hahn v. Moore, 127 Ind. App. 149, 133 N.E.2d 900 (1956), described It as
the attention, kindness and faithfulness of the child to his family. Justice Smith in
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960) described it as an integral
element of family life, as necessary parts are to a machine.
186 Louisville, NA. & C. R.R. v. Rush, 127 Ind. 545, 26 N.E. 1010 (1891).
187 Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Bell, 100 Ga. App. 438, 111 S.E.2d 784 (1959)
($54,000 to a mother for the death of a 17 year old daughter); Helder v. Michigan
Sugar Co., 375 Mich. 490, 134 N.W.2d 637 (1965) ($125,000 to parents of 8 year old
son).
188 American R.R. v. Didrickson, 227 U.S. 145 (1913).
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There has been a flurry of writing in the last decade challenging
"bloodless bookkeeping imposed upon our juries"1 9 which required
the juries to confine their considerations of damages to the services
minus cost of rearing formula.140 The courts in several jurisdictions
have responded to these pleas and the juries are awarding ever-in-
creasing damages to beneficiaries upon the death of a child.141 The
methods used to accomplish the results are perhaps as varied as are
the jurisdictions which have considered the question. The ap-
proaches, however, have in common the rejection of the services
minus cost of rearing formula. The discarding is done either ex-
plicitly, or more subtly by the simple judicial device of approving
large awards which are supported by only meager evidence. The
substitute methods are each vulnerable because they lack substance
when pierced by a probing examination. The two devices of valu-
ing filial care 42 or arbitrarily allowing the jury to award damages
for lost services after minority were mentioned previously. Neither
can withstand logical scrutiny. A Georgia statute allows the sur-
viving parent to be compensated for the loss of the child's services,
but no deduction is required for the probable cost of rearing1 43
This same "measurement" was used by a federal court interpreting
the Federal Tort Claims Act.144 Its failure, of course, is that it does
not measure at all, but simply chooses part of an established formula,
but discards the calculations which would diminish the total. An
older device that is still used is the presumption that the parents
have suffered a pecuniary loss by the death, and thus no proof of
the value of the services lost is required.1 "4 The celebrated case of
Wycko v. Gnodtke'46 used a more sophisticated, and perhaps bet-
ter reasoned, method. The Michigan court adopted a "lost invest-
ment" theory of damages whereby the wrongdoer was responsible
to the parents for the expenses they had realized by paying for the
child's birth, clothing, food, education and housing. The theory will
139 Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 342, 105 N.W.2d 118, 124 (1960).
140 See-Spangenberg, supra note 75, § 3.3, at 63; Miller, A Re-examination of the
Measure of Damages for the Death of a Minor Child, 15 DEy. L.J. 265 (1965).
141 See cases collected in 30 NACCA. L.J. 188-199 (1964).
142 See the recent case of Lockhart v. Besel, 426 P.2d 605 (Wash. 1967) for a
discussion of companionship and filial care.
143 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1308 (1956).
144 Hoyt v. United States, 286 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1961).
145 See, e.g., Black v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 146 Mich. 568, 109 N.W. 1052 (1906),
although this thinking has been abandoned in favor of the "lost investment theory"
set out in the above paragraph. See also Ihi v. Forty-Second Street & G. Street Ferry
Ry., 47 N.Y. 317 (1872).
146 361 Mich. 331, 105 NAW.2d 118.
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probably be widely emulated because it sounds reasonable, not to
mention that the opinion is convincingly written. Nevertheless, the
lost investment theory cannot escape the criticism that from what-
ever angle it is viewed, it amounts to no more than a recognition of
the companionship and love that has been taken through death.
Certainly the parents have invested heavily in the child's upbring-
ing, but just as certainly their return on the investment if the child
had lived would only be his love, kindness, devotion and services.
This writer's ambition is not to urge discarding of these ap-
proaches. On the contrary, they are serving the purpose of elimin-
ating an outmoded measuring device and will hopefully spur the
legislatures to study their wrongful death acts more closely. In the
interim, these tentative measures may serve as stepping-stones in
the attempt to find more accurate and fair valuation methods.
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES, LIMITATIONS ON DAMAGES,
THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RuLE AND TAxEs
There are four items yet to consider which did not fit into sec-
tions previously discussed, but which are important enough to de-
serve brief individual comment.
A. Punitive Damages
The Alabama and Massachusetts statutes state that only puni-
tive damages may be awarded in a wrongful death action.147 The
amount awarded depends entirely upon the wrongdoer's culpability,
and no regard is given to the pecuniary losses actually suffered by
the survivors. Numerous commentators have directed scorching crit-
icisms at this practice, concluding that there is no logic or justifica-
tion in its application. 148 These punitive provisions were probably
reactions to the civil immunity which protected a slayer prior to
any wrongful death acts.149 Nevertheless, it is a bold critic who
states that there is no logic in the provisions. One need focus only
momentarily on the confusion which prevails in wrongful death
actions to conclude that a more accurate and efficient approach is
urgently needed. Why not punitive damages, or even a form of
"wergild" wherein the legislature would decide what a defendant
should pay for taking a life? Every precaution is exercised to assure
that a criminal defendant is punished to the same extent whether
147 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1958); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 229 § 2 (1955).
148 C. McCoRMICiK, DAMAGES, § 103 at 357 (1935); SpisER, 71, § 3:3 at 71,
149 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 148 at 357.
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he has burglarized a worthless warehouse or the Chase Manhattan
Bank. On the other hand, the emphasis in wrongful death cases,
and tort law generally, is to insure that defendants are treated dif-
ferently depending on who the victim was. Acknowledging that the
purpose of tort law is different from that of criminal law does not
decide the question. Present day claimants are realizing great strides
in recovering damages, but it may be questioned whether defendants
have been given the same considerations. Investigating this line of
argument would entail a thorough and lengthy discussion which
is not appropriate for this article. The thought of awarding a stand-
ard "man payment" or a form of punitive damages is simply sug-
gested as an alternative to present methods, and one that should
not be cast aside summarily.
Several other states allow awards of exemplary damages in ad-
dition to compensatory damages. Of these, some statutes explicitly
state that they are recoverable,5 0 while courts in other jurisdictions
have interpreted the general language of their acts as allowing the
jury to include such damages depending on the culpability of the
defendant."5
B. Limitations on Damages
The Colorado and Rhode Island acts provide that damages
awarded may not be less than 3,000 dollars and 5,000 dollars re-
spectively.152 The effect of these minimum limits is that a measure
of punitive damages is always available to claimants if their proof
fails to show other than nominal pecuniary losses.
The concern of commentators and plaintiffs in death cases,
however, has been that almost one-quarter of the American juris-
dictions provide maximum limitations on death damages.15a Any
justification for these limits is awkward to support if the state pur-
ports to be making a serious attempt at measuring pecuniary losses.
The measuring process obviously crumbles when the damages reach
the maximum amount allowable. Insurance lobbies should bear
part of the responsibility for the fact that these limits still exist.1 54
They were not, however, the source of encouragement which caused
the original enactments, rather it was the distrust of juries that leg-
350 See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-2 (1963); N.M. STATs. ANN. § 22-20.3
(1953).
:151 See, e.g., Boroughs v. Oliver, 226 Miss. 609, 85 So2d 191 (1956).
152 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-1 (1963); R.. GEN. L. ANN. § 10-7-2 (1956).
153 SPEtsER, § 7:2 and chart set out at 490.
154 See discussion in Comment, Wrongful Death Limitations it Oregon-A Ra-
tional Result or Historical Mistake 1 WniumurrE L. REv. 616 (1961).
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islatures so often display when they believe they have surrendered
too much power and discretion. The most obvious absurdity is that
these legislatures did not equivocate when they granted similar dis-
cretion to juries in personal injury actions. It is no more difficult
for an effective trial lawyer to arouse sympathy in a personal injury
case when he has a mangled living client than it is for him to gen-
erate similar passions for a death victim.
Several states have revoked the maximum limitations in the
last three decades, and it is likely that other conservative jurisdic-
tions will either raise their limits or abolish them completely in
future years.155
C. Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule has generally been adhered to in
most jurisdictions. That is, those which have adopted the rule hold
that funds coming to a beneficiary from a collateral source do not
mitigate the damages for which a defendant must pay. States which
spurn the'rule reason that a wrongful death award should be com-
pensatory, and if the beneficiaries have received compensation for
their losses from an outside source, recovery from the defendant
would be an undesirable windfall. There is obviously some merit
to the position of the critics, for a claimant may, in effect, receive a
double recovery if a jurisdiction accepts the rule. For example, hos-
pital bills may have been paid by Blue Cross Insurance, but most
jurisdictions would insist that the defendant is still liable for the
reasonable value of these expenses.' 5" The continued support for
the rule somewhat reflects an attitude that when given an innocent
plaintiff, a wrongdoer and a knotty problem, "the interests of so.
ciety are likely to be better served if the injured person is benefitted
.... "157 A loose translation of this kind of approach and language
in the law often means that the difficulties involved in solving the
problem, the confusion that might be wrought by a change in prece.
dent, and the apparent balance of the conflicting views constrains the
courts to favor the established method. The favored method here
happens to be acceptance of the collateral source rule. This is not to
say that the champions of the rule lack logic in their views. If an out.
side source has gratuitously conceded to support surviving benefici-
aries, there is no reason to give a defendant the benefit of the dona
155 Supra note 153.
150 See, e.g., Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959).
157 Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
968 (1954).
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tion. If a decedent possessed sufficient foresight to purchase insur-
ance, levying only the cost of the premiums on the tortfeasor would
hardly be an adequate substitute. It will not usually be known what
sacrifices, funds, energy and time were expended by the decedent in
investigating the purchase, and what amount would compensate for
these expenditures. If an employer grants continued wage payments
to survivors upon an employee's death, it usually cannot be ascer-
tained what benefits the decedent employee might have rejected
with other prospective employers because of this post-death pay-
ment, or how many times he and his fellows had to "strike" the
employer to gain this advantage.
This article will not further itemize and discuss the merits of
the various arguments set forth by each side, for there is abundant
expert material available in other writings. It is sufficient here to
realize the existence of the rule and to note that the propriety of
its application is often in question in death cases. Only two situa-
tions need be mentioned which are of particular interest in death
cases. First, no reported case was discovered which diminished a sur-
vivor's recovery because of life insurance proceeds received. The
majority also deny the wrongdoer mitigation of damages for medical
insurance payments a beneficiary has received.15S Second, a majority
of jurisdictions hold that the remarriage of a surviving spouse will
not benefit a tortfeasor, reasoning that damages are measured as of
the date of death and what the survivor does subsequently is of no
concern to the defendant.15 9 The courts who accept the rule do not
even allow evidence or mention of the remarriage to be used in
court for fear that the survivor will be prejudiced in the estimation
of the jury..60
D. Federal Income Taxes
There is no federal income tax liability levied on a wrongful
death award,1' 1 and the problem presented is whether the jury
should be instructed concerning this fact. Most jurisdictions hold
that no instruction or argument may be presented to the jury which
concerns any aspect of income taxes, and a trial court will suffer a
reversal if the jury has received this "improper" instruction. 62 The
158 Stathos v. Lemich, 213 Cal. App. 2d 52, 28 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1963).
159 Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
160 Seaboard Air Line RYL v. Connor, 261 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1958); Bunda v.
Hardwick, 376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965).
161 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 104 (a) (2).
162 agner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Il. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E2d 771 (1955);
Bergfeld v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 103 Ohio App. 87, 144 N.E12d 483 (1956). A
more complete list of jurisdictions is listed in Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1408 (1959).
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stated justifications for failing to advise the jury of the non-taxability
of the award are that it would confuse if not antagonize them.10 8
The issue of purportedly confusing the jury with an instruc-
tion can be handled summarily. In fact, the instruction could be as
simple as advising of the non-taxability of the award and directing
the jury to neither add to nor deduct from the computed recovery
because of tax considerations.1 0 4 The fact of confusion exists only
in the thinking of the courts which have combined this simple sit-
uation with the more complex problem of whether evidence of in-
come tax on decedent's future contributions should be considered. 105
This latter problem is admittedly difficult and will be discussed in
subsequent paragraphs. It is important, however, to first understand
that a tax instruction to the jury carries none of the difficulties in-
herent in the problem of evidence of taxes concerning lost contri-
butions. It is unknown whether the jury correctly disregards tax
considerations or incorrectly either adds to or deducts from the com-
puted recovery because of their guesses about tax liability. This
writer believes, however, that whatever the jury's reaction, it should
not be left to chance that they correctly ignore tax considerations.
Some commentators fear that an instruction about taxes would an-
tagonize the jury so they would impose their own "tax" by reducing
the award rather than allow the claimant to escape tax liability.100
It is suggested by this writer that if a jury accepts only those instruc-
tions it likes and discards others, there is a radical deficiency in our
system. It is doubtful whether any jury decision or award is near
accurate if these triers of fact arbitrarily disregard evidence and in-
structions and substitute their own estimates.
The second and more difficult problem is whether the jury
should receive evidence concerning prospective taxes on decedent's
probable future earnings. Most jurisdictions apparently support the
view that gross earnings should not be reduced because of taxes that
would have been levied if the decedent had lived.107 Only decedent's
163 27 NACCA L.J. 302 (1963).
104 See sample instruction in Nordstrom, Income Taxes & Personal Injury
Awards, 19 OHio ST. L.J. 212, 235 (1958). See also Morris, Should Juries in Personal
Injury Cases be Instructed that Plaintiff's Recoveries are not Income within the Mean.
ing of Federal Tax Law? 3 DEF. L.J. 3 (1958).
165 See Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952)
where the court obviously confused the two issues.
166 Supra note 163.
167 Bergfeld v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 103 Ohio App. 87, 144 N.E.2d
483 (1956); Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa.
530, 190 A.2d 293 (1963).
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probable personal expenses are deducted from gross earnings to com-
pute the award.
The proponents of the theory that recovery should be reduced
by a sum equivalent to what would have been decedent's tax liabil-
ity observe that fairness and accuracy demand the deduction.165 They
acknowledge that there are speculative elements inherent in the
estimate such as the number of exemptions in the future and the
basic tax rate itself. Nevertheless, they also recognize that the assur-
ance of some taxes is certain,16 9 and that a wrongful death award
is based primarily on speculation in all of its aspects.
The arguments of the opponents (i.e., opposed to evidence con-
cerning taxes) are more varied, and though not always logical, they
have been successful in blanketing opposition by sheer weight of
numbers and repitition. A favorite argument is that the deduction
would be too conjectural. 170 As noted throughout this paper, so is
the very act of prophesizing that decedent would have earned any
wages in the years to come. The majority of the courts also point
out that the question of taxes, being a question of "status" of the
parties, is a matter between the taxpayer and the government.171
This point may be granted; however, it avoids the issue. One com-
mentator has correctly noted that although future disposition of
the award is a claimant's concern only, the process of measuring the
size of the award is very much within the realm of the court.17 2
The point has been made that if tax matters were allowed in evi-
dence, the defendant might unfairly and arbitrarily benefit because
the decedent was in the "upper bracket."'178 That defendant would
realize these gains seems very fair to this writer in that the degree of
his liability in damages is otherwise based almost wholly on de-
cedent's "bracket;" i.e., his earnings, future prospects, contributions
and relative position in society. It therefore seems that any evidence
affecting earnings would be pertinent, and not just that which fav-
ors the claimants.
The final resolution of this problem is undoubtedly several
years away, and there are other ingenious arguments yet to be
aired. The purpose of this section is not to suggest final disposition
168 2 F. Ha"'s & F. JAmES, TowS, 1326 (1956). See also Cox v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967).
:169 Id.
170 16 NACCA L.J. 211, 215 (1955).
371 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Arz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Hall V.
Chicago & N.V. R.R., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E2d 77 (1955).
172 Nordstrom, supra note 164 at 221-22.
373 Spangenberg, Proof of Damages for Wrongful Death, § 3.6 in Wkocurm
DEATH AND SURVIVORSHIP, (Beal, ed. 1958) at 88.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of the dispute. It should be noted, however, that an assault on the
majority position is apparent in at least the federal courts. The
march began as dictum in 1960174 and has since earned several ad-
herents. which have used the dictum to substantiate reducing an
award by deducting probable tax liability. The present status of
the assailants is that "where the impact of income tax has a signifi-
cant and substantial effect in the computation of probable future
contributions... [it] may not be ignored."' 75
VI. CONCLUSION
It is most difficult to set forth a meaningful conclusion without
again giving full textual treatment to each area with which this
writer has previously dealt. Nevertheless, some broad summarizing
may be attempted which will hopefully illuminate the many singu-
lar problems which cause confusion in the courts.
The most obvious lesson to be gained from this study is that
both the patterns of statutes and judicial interpretation of these
acts are often aimless and inaccurate. Few would demand that simply
because our nation is a federated republic we should insist on civil
laws that are consistent with one another in every state jurisdiction.
The need for some uniformity, however, is refreshingly inviting
after reviewing death cases from the many jurisdictions. Our deal-
ings with the common law have taught that in most given factual
situations, the courts will act in a fairly predictable fashion. The
only certainty in statutorily based death cases, however, is that from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the results of a litigated death action
are entirely unpredictable. Even within the same jurisdiction, it is
seldom known when a court will reject the pecuniary damages rule,
throw out the traditional process of measuring damages for the loss
of a child, or compose an instruction concerning the impact of
taxes on a recovery. The statutes are often crude copies of Lord
Campbell's Act and no apparent attempt has been made in most
jurisdictions to synchronize the purposes of the acts with the needs
of our more modern society. Children do -not often hold factory
positions' today; nor do juries need to be arbitrarily limited by a
statute which sets a maximum amount of damages for fear that the
174 McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & Hartford R.R., 282 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1961); Montellier v. United States, 202 F.Supp. 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1962).
175 Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1967). See also
In re Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966); O'Con-
nor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959); Nollenberg v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 216 F.Supp. 734 (S.D. Calif. 1963).
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emotions of the jurors will dictate an excessive award. A very real
vacuum is created by the death of a father or mother, but it is not
substituted for by calculating that twenty-three minutes per day of
moral guidance times three dollars per hour times life expectancy
equals the child's loss. Parents do not set certain designated times
aside to instruct and counsel. Rather, their actions, temperament,
understanding and companionship nurture the child and assist his
maturing.
The tenor of these conclusory remarks propels inescapably to-
wards the need for a model death act. The difficulty of such a task
may be indicated by the paucity of attempts at composing such an
act. An effort was expended in this direction in 1942, but apparently
never reached fruition.17 6 Recommendations and articles since that
time have been directed at specific shortcomings of certain judicial
processes in death cases, or the failure of a particular state to pro-
vide adequate statutory or judicial administration. Although such
discussions have merit within a limited realm, they cannot present
a broad and logical answer to the myriad problems raised by ad-
judication of death cases. Only a concerted effort at uniform legis-
lation can reach that result.
Charles Sherman Bloom
176 See Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Acts and the Action for Wrongful
Death, 16 TuLANE L. REv. 386 (1942).
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